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COMMENTS
DOES CONGRESS HAVE THE CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY
TO EXPATRIATE AMERICAN CITIZENS?
INTRODUcTION
In 1967, in the landmark case of Afroyim v. Rusk,1 the United
States Supreme Court appeared to settle once and for all the question
of whether Congress had the statutory power under the Constitu-
tion to involuntarily expatiate American citizens.2 Giving an un-
equivocal negative answer, Mr. Justice Black wrote:
We hold that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to, and does,
protect every citizen of this Nation against ... forcible destruction of
his citizenship.... Our holding... give[s] to [each] . . . citizen that
which is his own, a constitutional right to remain a citizen in a free
country unless he voluntarily relinquishes that citizenship. 3
Nevertheless, a scant four year later, the Court, in Rogers v. Bellei,4
held that the fourteenth amendment was inapplicable 5 to citizens who
were born outside of the United States and enjoy their citizenship
solely on the basis of being children of American citizens. Thus,
plaintiff Bellei, born in Italy, the son of an American mother and an
Italian father, was denationalized for failing to comply with the five-
year continuous residency requirement of the statute conferring him
with citizenship.6 Mr. Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority,
1. 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
2. Strictly speaking, "expatriation" is a voluntary renunciation of citizenship,
while "denationalization" refers to a statutory confiscation. This comment will treat
these terms as being identical.
3. Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 268 (1967) (emphasis added).
4. 401 U.S. 815 (1971).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1 states: "All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States .... "
6. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (1970). Section
1401 (a) (7) confers citizenship, while section 1401(b) prescribes the residency require-
ment:
(a) The following shall be nationals and citizens of the United States at
birth:
(1) a person born in the United States, and subject to the juris-
diction thereof;
(7) a person born outside the geographical limitations of the United
States and its outlying possessions of parents one of whom is an alien,
and the other a citizen of the United States who, prior to the birth of
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found that provision to be a valid condition subsequent. This decision
marked the end of a thirteen-year Court trend holding various congres-
sional denationalization provisions unconstitutional. It has, at least in
part, undermined Afroyim, and once again raised the question of the
congressional expatriation power. This paper will attempt to analyze
the implications of Rogers v. Bellei, in view of the shift in the law that
it may portend.
I. THE EARLIER CASES
A. The Voluntary Act Standard
The question of expatriation is an old legal problem. The Eng-
lish common law and early nineteenth century American cases fol-
lowed the feudal doctrine of "indefeasible allegiance," whereby a citi-
zen could not voluntarily expatriate himself without sovereign ap-
proval. In Shanks v. DuPont,7 the Marshall Court, per Mr. Justice
Story, said:
The general doctrine is, that no persons can by any act of their own,
without the consent of the government, put off their allegiance and
become aliens.8
The vast majority of expatriation cases, however, have involved an
involuntary expatriation of a citizen by the government. In Osborne v.
Bank of the United States,9 Chief Justice Marshall said, in dictum:
The simple power of the national Legislature, is to prescribe a uniform
rule of naturalization, and the exercise of this power exhausts it, so far
as respects the individual.10
In 1868 the fourteenth amendment was ratified. Its effect on ex-
patriation law was discussed in United States v. Wong Kim Ark." In
such person, was physically present in the United States or its outlying
possessions for a period or periods totalling not less than ten years, at
least five of which were after attaining the age of fourteen years....
(b) Any person who is a national and citizen of the United States at birth
under paragraph (7) of subsection (a) of this section, shall lose his nationality
and citizenship unless he shall come to the United States prior to attaining
the age of twenty-three years and shall immediately following any such coming
be continuously physically present . . . for at least five years: Provided, that
such physical presence follows the attainment of the age of fourteen years and
precedes the age of twenty-eight years.
7. 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 242 (1830).
8. Id. at 246.
9. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
10. Id. at 827.
11. 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
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this case the Court held that a person born in the United States to alien
parents of Chinese ancestry could not be kept out of the country by
the Chinese Exclusion Acts, since.he was a citizen by birth and had not
voluntarily renounced his citizenship. The Court stated that "[t]he
power of naturalization, vested in Congress . . . is a power to confer
citizenship, not a power to take it away.' 2 However, it was said in dicta
that the fourteenth amendment:
has not touched the acquisition of citizenship by being born abroad
of American parents; and has left that subject to be regulated, as it
had always been, by Congress, in the exercise of the power... to estab-
lish an uniform rule of naturalization.'3
During the first half of the twentieth century, the Court upheld the
denationalization authority of Congress under the foreign affairs or
war powers. In order to be expatriated, the citizen had to commit a
voluntary act. However, this voluntary act did not have to be performed
with the intent or desire to renounce United States citizenship. It was
sufficient that Congress had statutorily provided that a given act would
result in denationalization and that the citizen had voluntarily com-
mitted that act. Thus, in the leading case of Mackenzie v. Hare,14 the
Court unanimously sustained a law involuntarily expatriating Amer-
ican women who married foreign nationals, 5 even though the plain-
tiff and her husband were domiciled in the United States. Under the
power to regulate foreign affairs, Mr. Justice McKenna found that Con-
gress could have decided that:
[Such] an act may bring the Government into embarrassments and,
it may be, into controversies. It is as voluntary and distinctive as ex-
patriation and its consequence must be considered as elected.16
In Perkins v. Elg,17 the Court refused to apply a statute denational-
izing United States citizens who become naturalized citizens 6f an-
other country.'8 In this case, plaintiff, a native-born citizen, had been
12. Id.-at 703 (emphasis-added).
13. Id. at 688 (emphasis added). The naturalization power is conferred on Congress
by the Constitution via art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
14. 239 U.S. 299 (1915).
15. Act of.March 2, 1907, ch. 253.4, 34 Stat. 1228.
-16., 239 U.S. at 312. The government has recently conceded that such a provision-is
unconstitutional. Rocha v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 450 F.2d 946 (1st. Cir.
1971).
17. 307 U.S. 325 (1939).
18. Act of March 2, 1907, ch. 2534, 34 Stat. 1228.
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taken to Sweden by her parents as a child, thereby becoming a Swedish
citizen under that country's laws. At the age of twenty-one, she chose
to return to America to live. Following the earlier Mackenzie theme,
albeit to achieve a different result, Chief Justice Hughes held that the
statute was only aimed at voluntary acts, and that "the intent not to
return could not properly be attributed to her during minority... .,,10
While this construction of the statute avoided the issue of its constitu-
tionality, it is clear that the authority of Congress to pass such legis-
lation was not seriously doubted.
Similar reasoning was applied in Savorgnan v. United States, 20
where, in order to marry an alien, appellent signed an oath renouncing
her American citizenship and swearing allegiance to the King of Italy.
The documents, however, were in Italian, which Mrs. Savorgnan could
not read. Although a federal district court found that plaintiff had not
intended to renounce her allegiance to the United States, the Supreme
Court found this to be immaterial. Once again, the test of renunication
of citizenship was an objective one; the fact that the documents had
been signed voluntarily was a sufficient ground for expatriation. The
Court did not consider any constitutional issues.
The case of Kawakita v. United States21 is an unusual one in that
defendant, a dual national born in the United States of Japanese par-
ents, was "trapped" in Japan during World War II. Kawakita eventually
registered in Japan as a citizen, swore allegiance to the Emporer, joined
the Japanese armed forces, and committed atrocities against American
prisoners of war. The Court, per Mr. Justice Douglas, refused to find
as a matter of law that the defendant had renounced his American
citizenship, allowing a conviction for treason and sentence of hanging
to stand.
B. The Voluntary Renunciation Standard
The trend toward a voluntary renunciation of citizenship standard
for denationalization started with two companion cases which were
decided in 1958. In Perez v. Brownell,22 the Court held constitutional
19. Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 339 (1939). Cf. Mandoli v. Acheson, 344 U.S.
133 (1952), holding that a native-born American taken to Italy as a child retained his
citizenship ec'en though he had not expressly elected to become a United States citizen
on reaching his majority.
20. 338 U.S. 491 (1950).
21. 343 U.S. 717 (1952).
22. 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
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a statute providing that a United States citizen, "by birth or naturaliza-
tion, shall lose his nationality by ... [v]oting in a political election in
a foreign state .... ,,23 Writing for a five to four majority, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter said that in order for Congress to validly legislate, a ra-
tional nexus must exist between the act of Congress and some specific
power given to it under the Constitution. Here, Congress could act
under the foreign affairs power, and since an American citizen partici-
pating in the political affairs of another country could well prove to
be a source of embarrassment to this country, there was such, a ra-
tional nexus. In addition, voting in a foreign election implies an ele-
ment of allegiance to that country. Thus, the provision was upheld
as a reasonable exercise of congressional power. To emphasize his
views, Mr. Justice Frankfurter remarked that "it would be a mockery
of this Court's decisions to suggest that a person, in order to lose his
citizenship, must intend or desire to do so. '"24
In a thoughtful dissent, Chief Justice Warren concluded that Con-
gress has no power to denationalize, even though a citizen, by certain
acts, may expatriate himself. Thus,
citizenship may not only be voluntarily renounced through exercise
of . .. expatriation but also by other actions in derogation of undi-
vided allegiance to this country .... Any action by which [a citizen]
manifests allegiance to a foreign state may be so inconsistent with
the retention of citizenship as to result in loss of that status. 25
According to the Chief Justice, the mere act of voting in a foreign
election, regardless of the surrounding circumstances, should not be
held sufficient per se to automatically forfeit United States citizenship; 26
the statute's language was too broad. In a separate dissent, Mr. Justice
Douglas went further, saying that while the fourteenth amendment
grants citizenship, nothing in the Constitution allows it to be taken
away; it can only be lost if intentionally waived.27
Perez thus presents the three principal views on denationalization:
the Frankfurter (and Harlan) idea that Congress may prescribe reas-
onable conditions for loss of citizenship; the absolutist idea of Douglas
(and Black) that Congress may prescribe no conditions for involuntary
23. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.G. § 1481(a)(5) (1970).
24. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 61 (1958) (emphasis added).
25. Id. at 68.
26. Id. at 78.
27. Id. at 83.
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loss of citizenship; and the intermediate view of Warren that although
Congress cannot denationalize, a citizen, by his actions, may forfeit
his American citizenship.
Immediately succeeding Perez was Trop v. Dulles,28 the first de-
cision of the Supreme Court to invalidate an expatriation statute. In
another five to four decision, Chief Justice Warren, this time writing
for the majority, voided a law prescribing denationalization for war-
time desertion.29 Although the Chief Justice retained the principles
articulated in his Perez dissent, he recognized that they had just been
rejected by the majority. Thus, an alternative rationale was given-Con-
gress was using denationalization as a punishment to deter wartime de-
sertion. In view of the possible consequence of being a stateless person,
such punishment was found to be cruel and unusual, violating the
eighth amendment.30 This was so in spite of the fact that wartime de-
sertion was also punishable by the death penalty.
The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan, who had joined
in the Court's decision to uphold the involuntary expatriation in
Perez, purported to follow the rational nexus rationale. In Trop, how-
ever, Mr. Justice Brennan simply did not find a sufficient connection
between the war power of Congress and denationalization for wartime
desertion, analogizing this situation to expatriation of a taxpayer for
shirking his duty to pay taxes. 31
Dissenting, Mr. Justice Frankfurter not surprisingly found the
nexus "between refusal to perform this ultimate duty of American
citizenship and legislative withdrawal of that citizenship."3 2 As for the
cruel and unusual punishment argument, Frankfurter somewhat sar-
castically questioned whether loss of citizenship was "a fate worse than
death." 33
28. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
29. Nationality Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 1168-69, as amended 8 U.S.C, § 1481 (a) (8)
(1970).
30. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958). But see Marks v. Esperdy, 377 U.S.
214, (1964), where an evenly divided Court affirmed the denationalization of an American
whb served in the rebel army of Fidel Castro during the Cuban Revolution. The lower
court had found no cruel and unusual punishment.
31. 356 U.S. at 113.
32. Id. at 122.
33. Id. at 125. The subsequent case of Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129 (1958),
reversed a lower court's decision denationalizing an American citizen and dual national,
who was drafted into the Japanese army during World War II. That case turned on
the government's failure to meet the requisite burden of proof that plaintiff's conduct
was voluntary.
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The consolidated cases of Rusk v. Cort, and Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez,34 refused to allow plaintiffs' expatriation for leaving the coun-
try for the purpose of draft evasion during time of war or national
emergency.35 In these cases, Mendoza-Martinez had been convicted of
draft evasion and ordered deported, while Cort had never been tried.
Unable to reach a majority view, the Court's five to four decision
was fragmented into five separate opinions. The principal opinion by
Mr. Justice. Goldberg managed to avoid the constitutional question
of Congress' expatriation power. Instead, it held that the loss of citi-
zenship here was primarily penal, and thus could not be validly accom-
plished by the statute's automatic forfeiture provision. Such a punitive
measure required judicial or administrative proceedings, with appro-
priate due process safeguards: the right of confrontation of witnesses,
assistance of counsel, etc.
Justices Black and Douglas joined in the opinion of the Court, but
also concurred separately, repeating their position that Congress was
proscribed by the fourteenth amendment from denationalizing Amer-
ican citizens. Mr. Justice Brennan concurred in the result, finding the
statute unconstitutional under either the lack of a rational nexus or
cruel and unusual punishment approaches of Trop v. Dulles.386 The
principal dissent, by Mr. Justice Stewart, would have sustained expa-
triation under the war power as legitimately "removing a corrosive in-
fluence upon the morale of a nation at war. ' '3 7
In Schneider v. Rusk,3 8 the Court invalidated a statutory provision
calling for automatic expatriation of a naturalized citizen who resided
for three years "in the territory of a foreign state of which he was
formerly a national. . . ."39 Mr. Justice Douglas would have preferred
to apply the reasoning of the dissenters in Perez. Since that position did
not command a majority, however, he decided the case on due process
grounds. Starting with the assumption that the citizenship rights of the
foreign-born naturalized citizen are equivalent to those of the native-
born, 0 the Court found that the statute assumes
34. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
35. Both cases involved provisions currently found in the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act of 1952, § 349(a) (10), 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a) (10) (1970).
36. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
37. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 213 (1963).
38. 377 U.S. 163 (1964).
39. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 352(a) (1), 8 U.S.C. § 1484(a) (1)
(1970).
40. Note, however, that only native-born Americans may be elected President of
the United States. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
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that naturalized citizens as a class are less reliable and bear less al-
legiance to this country than do the native born. This is an assumption
that is impossible for us to make.41
Thus, since the native-born American citizen is totally free to spend
as much time as he wishes in any foreign country without suffering
denationalization, the statute created a "second-class citizenship.
' 42
Such discrimination is so unjust, it is a violation of due process of law.43
The dissent of Mr. Justice Clark pointed out that plaintiff, Mrs.
Schneider, had returned to her native land (Germany), had lived there
for the previous eight years, had married a German national, had borne
four sons there, and admitted having no intention of returning to the
United States. Mr. Justice Clark concluded that plaintiff
wishes to retain her citizenship on a standby basis for her own benefit
in the event of trouble. There is no constitutional necessity for Con-
gress to accede to her wish.44
Thus, whatever the merits of the statute, as to this plaintiff, under the
instant circumstances, the dissent found no violation of due process and
would have sustained the provision.
Three years after Schneider, and despite the absence of a change
in Court personnel, the voluntary renunciation theory of Justices
Black and Douglas appeared to win a total victory in Afroyim v. Rush.45
Afroyim involved the denationalization of a naturalized United States
citizen who had spent ten years in Israel and had voted there. The
statute in question was section 349 of the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952,46 the same provision that had been found constitutional
nine, years earlier in Perez v. Brownell.47 The five to four majority
opinion by Justice Black specifically overruled Perez, stating:
[W]e reject the idea expressed in Perez that, aside from the Fourteenth
Amendment, Congress has any general power, express or implied,
to take away an American citizen's citizenship without his assent.
... [I]t cannot... be sustained as an implied attribute of sovereignty
possessed by all nations.48
41. Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964).
42. Id. at 169.
43. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
44. 377 U.S. at 178.
45. 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
46. 8U.S.C. § 1481(a)(5) (1970). ',
47. 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
48. Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 257 (1967).
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Not only did the Court find no affirmative Congressional expatriation
power, it held that the citizenship clause of the fourteenth amendment
("All' persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States .... ") con-
ferred an absolute citizenship that could not be revoked by Congress.
The Court thus abandoned its policy of piecemeal invalidation of de-
nationalization statutes, and, in effect, struck them all down. No longer
could loss of citizenship be predicated on the mere voluntary perform-
ance of some act which Congress declared would result in denationali-
zation. In order to be expatriated, an American citizen mfs volun-
tarily renounce his allegiance.49  I , .
The rationale behind the sweeping opinion in Afroyim is ques-
tionable, and the case was immediately criticized. 50 Mr. Justice Black
at first sought to give an historical analysis and justification for the
Court's new interpretation of the citizenship clause. However, even he
admitted that this argument was less than convincing.51 Mr. justice
Black ultimately relied on the language of the fourteenth amendment
to sustain his position. But, as one commentator has noted, the lan-
guage of the citizenship clause "is singularly ambiguous" 52 and supports
an opposite interpretation equally well.
Finding the majority's historical analysis "wholly inconclusive',"
Mr. Justice Harlan presented his own version in a vigorous dissent.58
He found the purpose of the citizenship clause was to reverse' the .red
Scott decision 54 and to provide for a national citizenship. According to
Mr. Justice Harlan:
[Niothing in the history, purposes, or language of the [citizenship]
clause suggests that it forbids Congress in all circumstances to with-
draw the citizenship of an unwilling citizen.... [I]t is not proper
to create... an additional, and entirely unwarranted, restriction upon
49. Id. at 268.
50. See, e.g., 54 CORNELL L. REv. 624 (1969); 53 CORNELL L. REv. 325 (1968);
The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 HARv. L. Rzv. 126 (1967).
51. 387 U.S. at 267. Mr. Justice Black also stated that he agreed with Chief
Justice Warren's dissent in Perez. However, Warren's dissent did not support Black's
position, since the former believed that the commission of certain acts :other than
voluntary expatriation could result in loss of citizenship. See text at supra note 25.
52. The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 HARv. L. REv. 126, 136 (1967).
53. 387 U.S. at 291.
54. Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), held that Negroes "are not
and were not intended to be included ... under the word 'citizens' in the Constitu-
tion, and can therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which that instrument
provides for and secures to citizens of the United States. Id. at 404.
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the legislative authority. The construction now placed on the Citizen-
ship Clause rests . . . simply on the Court's ipse dixit, evincing little
more... than the present majority's own distaste for the expatriation
power.55
II. Rogers v. Bellei-RETREAT FROM ABSOLUTE CITIZENSHIP?
Aldo Mario Bellei was born in Italy on December 22, 1939, the son
of an American mother and an Italian father. While Bellei was thus a
United States citizen at birth, via the provisions of the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952,56 he would lose his citizenship under section
301 (b) of that Act if he did not reside in the United States for five
consecutive years between the ages of fourteen and twenty-eight.5 7 Plain-
tiff Bellei had visited America five times: twice as a child under his
mother's passport, twice (at ages fifteen and tventy-three) under his
oQwl United States passport, and once (age twenty-five) as an alien
visitor under his Italian passport. He spent a total of approximately one
year in this country, concededly failing to fulfill the statutory require-
ments for maintenance of citizenship. Before reaching the age of
twenty-three, Bellei was twice given official written warnings about the
regulation. Plaintiff sued to enjoin the Secretary of State from enforc-
ing the denationalization.provisions, and for a declaratory judgment
that it was unconstitutional. In Bellei v. Rusk,15 a three-judge federal
district court held the provision to be invalid, based on the authority of
Schneider and Afroyim. 59 The district court recognized that the latter
two cases were distinguishable on their facts, in that both involved
naturalization-a form of citizenship expressly protected by the four-
tenth' amendment-while the instant case merely involved conferral
by congressional act. Nevertheless, the court did not find this distinc-
tion to be controlling. The court reasoned that Mr. Justice BIfhck's
55. 387 U.S. at 292-93.
56. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (7) (1970).
57. Id. at § 1401(b). See supra note 6 and accompanying text. A 1957 amend-
ment specified that absences from the country for a total of less than twelvc'mbnths
would not break the five-year continuous residency requirement. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b)
(1970).
58. 296 F. Supp. 1247 (D.D.C. 1969). In this case plaintiff, a United States citizen
at birth, stipulated that he did not meet the statutory requirements. If the facts, had
been in dispute the burden of proof on the issue of compliance would have been on the
government. It is uncertain whether such a burden would require a showing of "clear,
unequivocal and convincing evidence" or whether a mere "preponderance of the evi-
dence" would suffice. Gonzalez-Gomez v. Immigration and Naturalization Serf., 450
F:2d 103, 105 (9th Cir. 1971).
59. 296 F. Supp. at 1252.
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broad language in Afroyim did not ,contemplate leaving an ,entire
group of United States citizens beyond the constitutional protec-
tion.60 Afroyim absolutely barred the, involuntary expatriation of
American citizens.
The district court found somewhat more favor with the govern-
ment's alternate argument that
section 301 (b) is simply a reasonable way of [Congress'] assuring that
thildren of hybrid origin give some affirmative indication of desiring
to be part of our society as well as avail themselves of our protection:
and the opportunity to come to this country whenever it proves
expedient. 61
The court acknowledged that Congress has a legitimate concern that
children of such a marriage should in fact have some connection with
the United States if they are to be its citizens. However, once Congfess
conferred such citizenship at birth, Afroyim precluded its withdrawal
without the citizen's consent.
A concurring opinion implied that the principal difficulty of the
statute in question was that it stated a condition subsequent-it con-
ferred citizenship contingent upon the future performance of an act.
If the statute had instead imposed a condition precedent, deferring the
grant of citizenship until after the act was completed, the provision
would have met constitutional requirements, assuming the condition
was reasonable. 62 Failure to perform such a condition (a five-year resi-
dency requirement) would not involve involuntary expatriation, since
no citizenship would have been conferred in the first place.
Bellei v. Rusk was decided by the district court in 1969. Its result
seems compelled by Afroyim. However, by the time the government ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court, history had intervened. Mr. Justice
Fortas, one of the Afroyim majority, had resigned. 68 Thus, when the
appeal was argued before an eight-member Court in January, 1970, one
might have expected a deadlock to result. At any rate, after the ap-
pointment of Mr. Justice Blackmun, the case was reargued in Novem-
ber and was decided the following April. Appropriately, the five to four
60. Id. at 1251.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1253.
63. The replacement of Mr. Justice Clark by Mr. Justice Marshall in 1967 and
Chief Justice Warren by Chief Justice Burger in 1969 can be considered to cancel each
other out for present purposes.
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majority ,opinion was written by Mr. Justice Blackmun, who cast the
deciding vote.
In Rogers v. Bellei,64 the Supreme Court reversed the district
court, upholding the denationalization provision. More interesting
than the result, however, is the manner in which it was achieved. The
simplest approach would have been to flatly overrule Afroyim and limit
that case's holding to the proposition that merely voting in a foreign
election was not a constitutionally permissible reason for automatic in-
voluntary expatriation. The majority, however, would not so emascu-
late an opinion written a mere four years earlier. Instead, Afroyim
was merely undermined. One commentator has stated that in Beliei
"the Court did not ... either affirm or overrule Afroyim."00 In fact,
while Bellei referred to the Afroyim broad holding of barring all in-
voluntary expatriation, it seemed to do this arguendo, tolerating it for
the moment, because the Court was able to find that it did not apply to
the instant case.
Mr. Justice Blackmun started with the fourteenth amendment's
citizenship clause: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States . ".... 66 He then applied a very strict, literal construction to it.
Plaintiff Bellei was neither born, nor naturalized, in the United States.
He was not subject to its jurisdiction. Thus, the citizenship clause did
not apply to him. "He simply [was] not a Fourteenth-Amendment-first-
sentence citizen."67 The Court thus accepted the very argument sum-
marily rejected by the district court, which had based its holding on
Afroyim."s In the latter case, plaintiff was naturalized in the United
States; thus the two cases were deemed distinguishable.Since Bellei was not protected by the citizenship clause, his claim
was solely within the congressional statutory power, subject to the
limitations of the Constitution. The opinion presented an historical
analysis: under the common law, citizenship depended solely on the
place of birth and did not descend to offspring.0 9 Of course, this was
subject to legislative enlargement. The Constitution itself empowers
64. 401 U.S. 815 (1971).
65. The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 1-ATv. L. REv. 40, 72 (1971). Cf. Com-
ment, Involuntary Expatriation: Rogers v. Bellei-A Chink in the Armor o1 Affroyim
[sic), 21 Am. U.L. REv. 184 (1971); 40 FORDHAM L. Rpv. 141 (1971).
66. Emphasis added.
67. 401 U.S. at 827.
68. See text at supra note 60.
69. 401 U.S. at 878.
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Congress to "establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization. ' 70 The Court
quoted with approval the dictum from Wong Kim Ark,71 that citizen-
ship acquired by being born of American parents outside the terri-
torial limits of the United States was unaffected by the citizenship
clause. Thus, such a conferral of citizenship is "to be regulated ...
by Congress, in the exercise of the power ... to establish an uniform
rule of naturalization." 72 It is clear that Congress may grant or deny
citizenship to the foreign-born children of American parents at its
pleasure. In addition, Congress may unquestionably prescribe, as a
condition precedent to citizenship, a period of residency in this coun-
try,74. a point conceded even by plaintiff's counsel. The question then
becomes whether Congress may specify a residency requirement as a
condition subsequent within the bounds of due process. In answering
this question affirmatively, the Court recognized that there is a legiti-
mate concern as to the allegiance of a dual national such as the plain-
tiff. "One who has a dual nationality will be subject to claims from
both nations, claims which at times may be competing or conflicting.274
Thus, it is not unreasonable to fear that the dual national child has
a primary loyalty to the country of one parent's citizenship and his own
birth. For Congress to thus impose upon plaintiff a five-year residency
requirement "may not be the best [solution] that could be devised, but
... [it cannot be said] that it is irrational or arbitrary or unfair."75 Why
then, if the identical condition precedent is valid, should a condition
subsequent be less so? If anything, the Court found the latter to be an
act of generosity.76 Congress can choose from four alternatives with re-
spect to someone in Bellei's position. It can refuse to grant citizenship,
grant it on a condition precedent, a condition subsequent, or absolutely.
Since Congress will not, and need not, make an absolute grant, the
next best alternative for plaintiff is a condition subsequent.7 7 Such a
70. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
71. 169 U.S. 649 (1898). See text at supra note 13.
72. Id. at 688.
73. 401 U.S. at 828.
74. Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717, 733 (1952). See N. BAR-YAAcov,
DUAL NATIONALITY 4-5 (1961).
75. 401 U.S. at 833.
76. Id. at 835.
77. While a condition subsequent must meet due process requirements of reason-
ableness, a condition precedent might not have to satisfy as strict a standard. Cf. United
States v. Trevino Garcia, 440 F.2d 368, 369 (5th Cir. 1971): "The Constitution does
not mention the citizenship status of persons born outside the United States.... Thus
the Congress has a completely free hand in defining citizenship as it relates to persons
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rule would treat the child as an American citizen, allowing the benefits
of free access to the United States, travel on an American passport, and
diplomatic protection, before the residence requirement need be met.
To strike down section 301 (b) would probably cause Congress to
simply postpone the grant of citizenship until after the residency re-
quirement has been satisfied, withholding all benefits until that time.
Finally, the Court points out that Bellei will not become a stateless
person:
His Italian citizenship remains. He has lived practically all his life
in Italy. He has never lived in this country .... He asserts no claim of
ignorance or of mistake or even of hardship. He was warned several
times of the provision ....
... §301(b) has no constitutional infirmity in its application to
plaintiff Bellei.7 8
This seems to suggest that had an application of the statute in fact made
the plaintiff stateless, a different result would have occurred-perhaps
on the basis of estoppel79
The dissent of Mr. Justice Black was unusually bitter. Alleging
that Afroyim's broad construction had been overruled, he stated that
"precious Fourteenth Amendment American citizenship should not be
blown around by every passing political wind that changes the com-
position of this Court."8 10 He reiterated his view that Congress has no
power, in view of the citizenship clause, to pass a statute that involun-
tarily denationalizes an American citizen, unless and until that citizen-
ship has been freely renounced. The dissent viewed the majority posi-
tion as a reversion to Frankfurter's rational nexus standard in Perez.
Thus, Congress can now "rob a citizen of his citizenship just so
long as five members of this Court can satisfy themselves that the
congressional action was not 'unreasonable, arbitrary,' . . or
'irrational' .... ,,s
Mr. Justice Black rejected the "narrow, restrictive, and super-tech-
nical interpretations"8 12 of the fourteenth amendment contained in the
born abroad." But see Bellei v. Rusk, 296 F. Supp. 1247, 1253 n.1 (D.D.C. 1969):
"While Congress would have wide latitude in drafting a condition precedent to its
grant of citizenship, such conditions would have to comply with the fundamental re-
quirements of equal protection and due process." (Leventhal, J., concurring).
78. 401 U.S. at 836.
79. See The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARv. L. Rnv. 3, 69 n.33 (1971).
80. 401 U.S. at 837.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 839.
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majority's holding that since Bellei was not born or naturalized in.the
United States, he is not a constitutional citizen. The majority now makes
the citizenship of all children-born abroad to American citizens merely
second-class, outside the protection of the Constitution, and subject to
the whim of Congress. Coming on the heels of Afroyim, the dissent
pointedly comments that this construction is not "strict," but "pro-
ceeds on the premise that a majority of this Court can change the Con-
stitution day by day ... and year by year, according to its shifting no-
tions of what is fair, reasonable, and right.... [This] is the loosest con-
struction that could be employed."83
Mr. Justice Black's argument seems to ignore much of the history
of the Court, wherein a shift of one vote has often meant significant
changes in constitutional doctrine.84 He also neglects to mention that
it took the Court nearly one hundred years to "recognize" that the citi-
zenship clause gives the broad and sweeping protection construed by
Afroyim,85 and then only by a bare five to four majority with strong
opposition. Further, it took a shift in personnel (principally the replace-
ment of Frankfurter by Fortas) to allow Afroyim to overrule Perez, de-
cided only nine years earlier. Thus, Mr. Justice Black perhaps should
have been satisfied that Bellei did not flatly overrule Afroyim, but
merely limited it.
III. THE AFTERMATH: WHAT IS THE EXPATRIATION POWER
AFTER Bellei?
The immediate question raised after Bellei is: What does that
case do to the absolute citizenship doctrine promulgated by Afroyim?
The answer is not at all clear. One possibility is that it does relatively
little-a minor modification affecting only that class of citizens not
born or naturalized in the United States. True, for people in that
category the Court has, in effect, devised a new form of citizenship which
has certain earmarks of being "second-class." Nevertheless, for some-
one in Bellei's position, neither the residency requirements nor the
instant result would appear to be particularly unfair. There is clearly
83. Id. at 844.
84. For example, during the "New Deal" era, the sudden shift in position of Mr.
Justice Roberts in 1937 meant that five to four decisions consistently striking down
congressional legislation became five to four decisions upholding similar acts. See, e.g., L.
PFEFFER, THIS HONORABLE COURT 299-324 (1965).
85. The fourteenth amendment was adopted in 1868; Afroyim was decided in 1967.
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a legitimate apprehension on the part of Congress as to the allegiance
of a child born outside the United States of one citizen parent. In-
terestingly, the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 does not re-
quire such a residency on the part of a child born abroad of two Amer-
ican parents,"" although this could, of course, be amended in the future.
For the present, Bellei may work its greatest hardship on families of
Americans in the diplomatic service who have spent most of their time
abroad.
Another possible intepretation of Bellei would go further. Afroyim
did not merely hold that Congress was forbidden by the fourteenth
amendment to involuntarily withdraw citizenship. It also stated that
even in the absence of that amendment, Congress had no express or im-
plied constitutional power to denationalize one who is at that time an
American citizen.87 In Bellei, however, the Court, in the absence of
fourteenth amendment protection, unquestionably allowed the expa-
triation of one who was already a citizen. This clearly represents a con-
siderable undermining of Black's absolute citizenship position, which
now rests entirely on his interpretation in Afroyim of the scope and
effect of the 'citizenship clause. Bellei avoided a direct ruling on the
citizenship clause. Since plaintiff was expressly held not to be a "four-
teenth amendment citizen," there was no need to consider what that
phrase entailed. In fact, any such discussion would have been dicta.
As to the future, one can expect the government to appeal any
case involving a reaffirmation of Afroyim principles by a lower federal
court. If that should happen in the near future, considering the addi-
tional changes in the Court since Bellei, it would not be surprising to see
Afroyim further limited, or even overruled.
To this writer, a future decision limiting Afroyim to its facts, i.e.,
that voting in a foreign election regardless of circumstances is not suffi-
cient to denationalize, would be most welcome. Just as the Frankfurter
rational nexus approach8 in Perez goes too far in its allowance of con-
gressional power to involuntarily expatriate-precluding a judicial
inquiry into the citizen's subjective motives-the Black absolute citi-
86. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (2) (1970) provides that the following shall be United
States citizens at birth: "a person born outside of the United States and its outlying
possessions of parents both of whom are citizens of the United States and one of whom
has had a residence in the United States or one of its outlying possessions, prior to the
birth of such person ......
87. See text at supra note 48.
88. See text at supra notes 22-24.
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zenship theory goes too far in the opposite direction in limiting govern-
mental power. It is undesirable to absolutely forbid Congress, as
Afroyim apparently does, from denationalizing a citizen, regardless
of circumstances, unless he expressly renounces his allegiance.8 9 Surely
a more reasonable approach is that of Chief Justice Warren in his Perez
dissent (joined by Black and Douglas), whereby certain acts manifesting
allegiance to a foreign country would allow the inference of voluntary
renunciation of citizenship.90 The most obvious such act would be the
deliberate acquisition of foreign citizenship.91 At the very least, Afroyim
should not be able to totally preclude involuntary expatriation under
such circumstances.
The result in Rogers v. Bellei is clearly not demanded by the prior
decisions of the Supreme Court. It seems obvious that the district
court's opinion could have been affirmed on authority of Afroyim. The
instant decision is against the trend of thirteen years of contrary hold-
ings by the Court, and would seem to strongly signal a basic change
of policy in this area. The majority proclaims that not all United States
citizens are protected by the fourteenth amendment's citizenship clause.
This finding was indeed achieved, as Mr. Justice Black lamented, by a
"super-technical" construction of the clause.92 The employment of
this rationale allowed the Court to escape a head-on collision with
Afroyim. This is unfortunate. It leaves the area once again unsettled and
can only represent, at most, a postponement of the inevitable. In ob-
taining the Bellei result, it would have been better, and more honest,
for the Court to expressly renounce the broad holding of the former
case. This would have allowed the validation of the residency require-
ment of section 301 (b) without the need for the strained reasoning
of the majority.
Rogers v. Bellei will have an immediate impact in at least one
other area. The same provision of the Immigration and Nationality
89. Cf. Jolley v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 441 F.2d 1245 (5th Cir.
1971), where the plaintiff went to Canada and voluntarily renounced his citizenship in
order to avoid the draft. He later tried to rescind his renunciation on the ground of
its having been made under duress-he would otherwise have been forced to break the
Selective Service laws. The court rejected this argument, finding the renunciation to be
voluntary.
90. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 68 (1958).
91. Id. Cf. 54 CORNELL L. Rav. 624, 632 (1969), suggesting that voluntary
naturalization in a foreign country raises a rebuttable presumption of renunciation of
United States citizenship.
92. 401 U.S. at 839 (dissenting opinion).
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Act of 1952 which grants citizenship to the foreign-born child of an
American citizen also provides that, before the birth of the child, the
American citizen must have resided for ten years in the United States,
at least five of which were spent after attaining the age of fourteen. 8
The purpose of this restriction is to prevent "the specter of generations
of child emigres who will return .to this country to claim citizen-
ship.. .... 94 none of whom have ever been here or had any ties to the
United States. Recently, this proviso has been under attack as violating
due process, based on authority of Afroyim, Schneider v. Rush,95 and
Bellei v. Rusk.96 In Gonzalez de Lara v. United States,"7 this claim was
rejected by the Fifth Circuit. That court distinguished the former cases
as involving involuntary denationalization of citizenship already con-
ferred, while the present case merely dealt with the imposition of a
condition precedent for foreign-born children, within the constitutional
power of Congress.98 It seems clear that this result, coming a month
before Rogers v. Bellei, partly anticipated the latter; thus, an attack
on such a condition precedent in the present Court would seem
fruitless.
CONCLUSION
Since the passage of the fourteenth amendment, the power of the
government to involuntarily expatriate American citizens, as construed
by the Supreme Court, has varied considerably. In the first half of the
twentieth century, the explicit and implied powers of Congress were
held sufficient to sustain statutory denationalization for the commis-
sion of a specified act, if there was a reasonable connection between an
acceptable purpose desired by the national legislature and the use of
enforced loss of citizenship to accomplish that purpose.9 The act in
question must have been performed voluntarily, but no subjective
intent to renounce citizenship was required, or even relevant. In the
late 1950s, the Court started a trend to reverse the congressional ex-
patriation power. This culminated in Afroyim, where a majority held
that under the fourteenth amendment Congress had absolutely no con-
93. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (7) (1970).
94. Bellei v. Rusk, 296 F. Supp. 1247, 1252 n.17 (D.D.C. 1969).
95. 377 U.S. 163 (1964).
96. 296 F. Supp. 1247 (D.D.C. 1969).
97. 439 F.2d 1316 (5th Cir. 1971).
98. Id. at 1317 n.4. Accord, United States v. Trevino Garcia, 440 F.2d 368 (5th
Cir. 1971); Uribe-Temblador v. Rosenberg, 423 F.2d 717 (9th Cir. 1970).
99. See text at supra notes 14-24.
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stitutional power to denationalize; American citizenship could only
be lost by voluntary relinquishment. The scope of this holding was un-
warrantedly broad, and has been somewhat diluted by Bellei. Unfortu-
nately, the latter case has, perhaps, served to raise more questions than
it answers. The lower federal courts will surely find application of its
holding difficult. 00 Whether Bellei ultimately represents only a slight
undercutting of Afroyim, or whether it presages a return to the rational
nexus doctrine of Perez, or hopefully something in between, remains
to be seen. What is clear is that at the present time the denationalization
power of Congress is once again uncertain.
WILLIAM M. FEIGENBAUM
100. But cf. Hein v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 456 F.2d 1239 (5th
Cir. 1972), recently citing Rogers v. Bellei in support of its holding that a statute auto-
matically conferring citizenship on the biological children of naturalized aliens, but
denying such an automatic grant to adopted children, did not invidiously discriminate
against the latter. See 8 U.S.C. § 1432 (1970).

